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Tennessee v. Garner-The Use of Deadly Force to Arrest as an
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The United States Supreme Court historically has used the fourth amend-
ment1 as the foundation for examining a wide variety of police practices includ-
ing a warrantless arrest in a private dwelling,2 a search incident to arrest,3 the
use of an informant's tip to establish probable cause,4 a pat-down for weapons,5
and electronic eavesdropping. 6 In Tennessee v. Garner7 the Court extended its
application of the fourth amendment to the use of deadly force by a police officer
to apprehend a fleeing felon. The Garner Court held that the fourth amendment
prohibits the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon "unless it is neces-
sary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer
or others."'8 The Court in Garner thus struck down the common-law rule, still
in effect in twenty-three states, which allowed the use of deadly force whenever
necessary to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon.9
This Note analyzes Garner in light of other fourth amendment decisions
and focuses specifically on the expanded protection given to individual rights in
the fourth amendment balancing process when the use of deadly force is in-
volved. It also explores the public policy considerations underlying the aban-
donment of the common-law rule. The Note concludes that the rule the
Supreme Court adopted in Garner is a step in the right direction. However, it
also concludes that an additional requirement that the threat posed by the sus-
pect be immediate before the police can use deadly force would make the rule
more consistent with other fourth amendment cases and more responsive to pub-
lic policy concerns.
On the night of October 3, 1974, Eugene Garner, a five foot four inch, 110
pound, fifteen year-old, broke the window of an unoccupied residence and stole
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
3. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I
(1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
4. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
5. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
8. Id. at 1697.
9. Id. at 1703-04.
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ten dollars and a purse from inside the house.10 Alerted by a neighbor, two
police officers arrived at the residence in time to see Garner run from the back of
the house toward a six foot high chain link fence that enclosed the back yard.
After shining a flashlight on Garner and glimpsing his face and hands, Memphis
police officer Elton Hymon called out "police, halt" and moved toward Garner,
who was crouched beside the fence. Fearing that Garner would avoid capture,
Hymon shot at Garner, hitting him in the head while he climbed the fence.
Garner eventually died from his injuries.11 Officer Hymon later testified that he
had believed Garner to be about seventeen or eighteen years old, of slight build,
and unarmed.
12
Garner's father subsequently brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee, naming Hymon, the City of Mem-
phis, and various city officials as defendants. 1 3 The suit was filed under the
federal Civil Rights Act 14 to recover damages for alleged violations of the
fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments.1 5
The district court dismissed the action, upholding the constitutionality of
the Tennessee statute which authorized a police officer to use "all the necessary
means" to arrest a felon.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
10. Id. at 1697-98.
11. Id. at 1697.
12. Id. Hymon stated that he was not "certain" that Garner was unarmed, but that he had
believed him to be. Id.
13. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub noma.
Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
14. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
15. Garner, 710 F.2d at 241.
16. Garner, 710 F.2d at 242. The statute provided: "If, after notice of the intention to arrest
the defendant, he either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect
the arrest." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (Supp. 1985). Case law, rather than statute, establishes
that an officer may not use deadly force on a misdemeanant. See Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134,
114 S.W.2d 819 (1938).
The district court dismissed the case against the individuals on the basis of their qualified "good
faith" immunity, a holding with which both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court later
agreed. See Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1698-99; Garner, 710 F.2d at 242. The individual officers were
entitled to a qualified "good faith" immunity because they acted in reliance on Tennessee law. See
Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Quals v.
Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Beech v. Melancom, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
The district court initially dismissed the case against the city on the ground that under Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the definition of "persons" as used in § 1983 did not include municipal-
ities. Subsequently, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruled Monroe,
holding that municipalities qualify as "persons" and can be held liable for conduct that results from
a city "policy or custom." Id. at 690, 694. Monell was decided while Garner was on appeal; there-
fore, the court of appeals remanded Garner for reconsideration of the issue of the city's liability.
Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979). At the second hearing, the district
court upheld the statute's constitutionality and thus was unable to find the city liable. Garner, 710
F.2d at 242.
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Circuit reversed, holding that the Tennessee statute violated both the fourth and
fourteenth amendments when applied to nondangerous fleeing felons. 17 In ex-
amining the fourth amendment claim, the court of appeals held that the com-
mon-law rule which allowed the killing of any fleeing felon no longer is
appropriate. 18 The court held that the Tennessee statute offended the fourth
amendment because it did not limit the use of such a drastic measure on the
basis of the severity of the offense. 19 The fourth amendment, according to the
court of appeals, permits the use of deadly force only to apprehend dangerous
fleeing felons.
20
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, basing its hold-
ing on fourth amendment considerations. 2 ' The Garner Court reiterated the
balancing test it had established in previous fourth amendment decisions. Under
this test courts are to determine the reasonableness of a police officer's search or
seizure by weighing the extent of the intrusion on the individual's rights against
the importance of the governmental interests involved. 22 Applying this test the
Court balanced the intrusiveness of the use of deadly force on the suspect against
the governmental interest in apprehending fleeing felony suspects.2 3 Writing for
the majority, Justice White concluded that the proper balance is struck when
police officers are allowed to apprehend a fleeing felon by means of deadly force
only when the officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
serious danger to the officers or others.
24
Justice White acknowledged that at common law the use of deadly force
was considered reasonable whenever necessary to apprehend a fleeing felon.
25
Although this was the accepted definition of reasonableness at the time the
17. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
18. Id. at 242-44; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289 (setting forth the com-
mon-law rule).
19. Garner, 710 F.2d at 246. The court also found that the statute violated the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 246-47.
20. Id. at 247. In so ruling, the court approved the Model Penal Code approach, which
provides:
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: (i) the arrest is for a
felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer...; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to inno-
cent persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (A) The crime for which the arrest is made
involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (B) there is sub-
stantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if his
apprehension is delayed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 307(2)(b) (1962).
21. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1694.
22. Id. at 1699. The cases the Court cited for establishing the balancing test included United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
23. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700-01.
24. Id. The Court stated that probable cause would be established "if the suspect threatens the
officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe he has committed a crime involving the
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm." Id. at 1701. The rule adopted by the
Court is equivalent to the Model Penal Code approach except that the Court's rule requires probable
cause, instead of the officer's subjective belief that the suspect is dangerous. For the relevant text of
the Model Penal Code, see supra note 20.
25. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1702-03.
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fourth amendment was adopted, the majority concluded that application of the
common-law rule today is unacceptable. 26 Applying the modem balancing test
to the facts of Garner, the Court concluded that Officer Hymon did not have
probable cause to believe that Garner presented any danger to Hymon or to
others.27 The Court specified that burglary, a crime against property that sel-
dom involves physical violence, is not a sufficiently dangerous crime to justify
automatically the use of deadly force.28 The governmental interest in preventing
property crime does not justify the severe intrusion resulting from the use of
deadly force.29 The Court noted, however, that the use of deadly force against
an armed burglar would be reasonable.
30
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's abandonment
of the rule accepted at the time the fourth amendment was adopted. Justice
O'Connor suggested that a decision based on "purely judicial" constraints would
not present the same problem as the case in question which involved constitu-
tional constraints on state action.31 While the majority analyzed the use of
deadly force against any suspected felon, O'Connor limited her analysis to the
use of deadly force against suspected burglars. The dissenting justices would
have held that burglary is a per se serious and dangerous felony.32 Stressing the
magnitude of the governmental interest in effective law enforcement and the ab-
sence of a protectable interest in avoiding arrest, Justice O'Connor suggested
that the fourth amendment balancing test permits the use of deadly force when-
ever it is necessary to apprehend a suspected burglar. 3
3
Prior to Garner the Supreme Court had not considered the constitutionality
of a police officer's use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon. Although
some lower courts have considered the issue,3 4 Garner is the only case in which
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1706.
28. Id. at 1706-07.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1706.
31. Id. at 1709 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rhenquist joined
the dissent.
32. Id. at 1709-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1711 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. Only one lower court has declared unconstitutional a statute allowing the use of deadly
force to apprehend all fleeing felony suspects. In Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976),
vacated as moot per curiam sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the use of deadly force to apprehend nondangerous
fleeing felons violates due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Applying the
due process balancing test, the court reasoned that the taking of the fundamental right to life, with-
out the due process safeguards provided by a trial, could only be justified by a compelling state
interest. Id. at 1017-19. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments that the statute violated equal
protection and authorized cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1009-1011.
Other courts have upheld the use of deadly force to apprehend all fleeing felony suspects in the
face of various constitututional challenges. The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Tennessee had previously rejected contentions that the Tennessee statute at issue in Garner
(1) was overbroad in that it authorized an incursion into a person's right to trial by jury; (2) author-
ized cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment; and (3) violated due pro-
cess and equal protection by permitting the use of deadly force against felons but not against
misdemeanants. Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (three-judge
court). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second District rejected a due process challenge
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a court has analyzed fully the use of deadly force in light of the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 35 Because the
Court based its decision on fourth amendment considerations, the apprehension
of a fleeing felony suspect must be re-examined against the background of earlier
cases construing that amendment.
The balancing test used by the Court in Garner has its origins in a long line
of fourth amendment cases. 36 The Court has held that a search and seizure is
constitutional only if it is "reasonable" as determined by a balancing of the "na-
ture and quality of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intru-
sion." 37 Implicit in the balancing process is a recognition that as the govern-
mental interest in using a police procedure increases, the permissible amount of
intrusion on an individual's rights also increases. 38 Conversely, the more severe
the intrusion on the individual's rights, the greater the governmental interest
must be to justify the particular procedure under the fourth amendment.
39
Any type of governmental intrusion into an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy may invoke this fourth amendment balancing process.4° By its
nature, the balancing test is relatively formless, subjective, and, in part, based on
a common sense judgment.41 Nevertheless, the decisions in which the Court has
to a statute reflecting the common-law rule, stressing its desire to afford the individual states some
flexibility in fashioning rules of criminal law, particularly on such a controversial issue. Jones v.
Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1975). The Jones court, however, agreed with the plaintiff that
"the use of the felony label to justify especially severe police behavior has become increasingly
strained" and stated a preference for the Model Penal Code approach. Id. at 138-40. For the rele-
vant text of the Model Penal Code, see supra note 20.
35. Other cases have briefly mentioned the fourth amendment's applicability. For example, in
Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978), the court
stated in dicta that the use of deadly force to apprehend a nondangerous fleeing felon may be a
violation of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment may also be invoked in cases in which
police officers are found to have used excessive force to arrest. See, eg., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d
358, 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418 (1973); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1970); Cohen v. Norris, 300
F.2d 24, 31-33 (9th Cir. 1962). In these cases "excessive" force was construed to mean more force
than was necessary to effectuate the arrest.
36. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring) ("Mhe key principle of the fourth amendment is reasonable-
ness-the balancing of competing interests.").
38. Harris, The Supreme Court's Search and Seizure Decisions of the 1982 Term: The Emer-
gence of a New Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 36 BAYLOR L. RaV. 41, 47 (1984) (analyzing the
ingredients of fourth amendment reasonableness).
39. See id.
40. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding that electronic surveillance of a
public telephone booth is a governmental intrusion that may invoke the fourth amendment). Katz
makes clear that the fourth amendment's applicability is not limited to intrusions on private prop-
erty, and that the fourth amendment protects persons, not places. See id. at 351-52.
41. See Harris, supra note 38, at 47. Professor Harris contends that the fourth amendment test
the Court used from the 1940s to the 1960s was much less subjective and amorphous than is the test
the Court uses today. Id. at 43-44. He argues that during this period the Court set strict rules
concerning the requirements of the fourth amendment, such as one rule which stated that reasona-
bleness requires a warrant and probable cause except in a few "well-delineated" situations. Id. at 44.
Harris asserts that this approach has now given way to the new "pragmatic balancing approach."
Id. at 44-48.
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applied the balancing test have established certain guidelines that add some uni-
formity and objectivity to the test's application.
Prior decisions have established guidelines for determining the level of sus-
picion of illegal activity a police officer must have to justify a particular type of
search or seizure.42 The Court has held that, on balance, certain preliminary
inspections, such as observing objects in plain view, 43 approaching and question-
ing a willing individual in a public place,44 and stopping motorists at regular
roadblocks45 are reasonable under the fourth amendment even in the absence of
any suspicion of illegal activity. In these cases the governmental interest in mak-
ing a preliminary inspection outweighs the slight intrusion on the individual's
rights.
Certain frisks and investigatory detentions that involve a more serious in-
trusion, however, are not reasonable under the balancing test unless the police
officer has a "reasonable suspicion" of illegal activity.46 Brief detentions and
limited pat-downs for weapons have qualified as investigatory techniques that
are sufficiently intrusive to require "reasonable suspicion" on the part of the
police officer.47 Furthermore, the Court has held that a balancing of the govern-
mental and individual interests involved in a full scale search or arrest dictates
that probable cause must be present before police officers may use these proce-
dures.48 When a search or arrest is highly intrusive, as in the case of electronic
surveillance or a search or arrest in a private home, police officers must also
obtain a warrant before proceeding with the search or the arrest.49
Beyond the threshold probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or warrant re-
quirements, several decisions have examined the "reasonableness" of the manner
in which a particular search was conducted. In United States v. Sharpe50 the
Court held that the governmental interest in preventing the transportation of
drugs justified detaining suspected drug traffickers for a period of twenty min-
utes.5 1 In Schmerber v. California52 the Court concluded that taking blood
from a drunken driving suspect was justified in light of the balancing of compet-
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
43. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (affirming a police officer's right to seize ob-
jects in "plain view").
44. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer the Court ruled that a police officer needs
no objective justification for approaching an individual in a public place and asking whether the
individual is willing to answer questions. Id. at 497.
45. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
46. The level of suspicion required for "reasonable suspicion" is less than that required for
probable cause; nevertheless, it must be at least an "articulable" suspicion. United States v. Sharpe,
105 S. Ct. 1568, 1577 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring); accord Florida v. Royer, 454 U.S. 1079
(1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985) (brief detention of suspected drug traf-
ficker); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (pat-down search for weapons).
48. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978);
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
50. 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985).
51. Id. at 1576.
52. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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ing interests. 53 In Cupp v. Murphy 54 the Court approved the taking of samples
from under a murder suspect's fingernails.
55
Notwithstanding those decisions in which certain police practices were ap-
proved, the Court has made clear that the fourth amendment may preclude cer-
tain types of searches and seizures entirely, despite the presence of probable
cause and a warrant. In Winston v. Lee,56 for example, the Court held that
police-ordered surgery on a criminal defendant was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment because the governmental interest was not strong enough to
justify the resulting intrusion into the individual's body.
57
In Garner the Court made clear that the fourth amendment requires that
the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon be reasonable.5 8 The Court
stated that a reasonable balance must be struck between the competing govern-
mental and individual interests not only at the threshold stage of making a prob-
able cause or related determination, but also at the second stage when the
reasonableness of the manner of a particular search or seizure must be as-
sessed.59 The Court faced the difficult task of determining the point at which
the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon becomes reasonable under
the fourth amendment. Because the use of deadly force is a more significant
intrusion than those examined in other fourth amendment cases, the Court im-
posed a stricter and more limiting standard on its use.60 Only a strict standard
that limits the right to make a severe intrusion on the individual to those in-
stances in which the governmental interest is highest would be consistent with
the standards used in other fourth amendment cases.
6 1
When a search or seizure involves any manner of intrusion into a person's
body, the Court has found individual rights to be worthy of substantial protec-
tion. In Cupp the Court characterized the taking of samples from beneath a
suspect's fingernails as a "severe, though brief intrusion upon cherished personal
53. Id. at 771.
54. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
55. Id. at 296.
56. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
57. Id. at 1620.
58. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
59. Id.
60. For example, the intrusions involved in a pat-down for weapons, see, eg., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), or a warrantless automobile search, see, eg., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), are very different in degree from the intrusion involved in the use of deadly force. Indeed,
deadly force is not comparable to a blood test, see, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, or even to surgery
under general anesthesia, see, e.g., Winston, 105 S. Ct. 1611.
61. None of the variations of the common-law standard are strict enough to achieve this consis-
tency. Most jurisdictions that have used the common-law rule have required (1) that deadly force be
"apparently" rather than "actually" necessary to effect the arrest, and (2) that the officer have a
reasonable belief that a felony had been committed rather.than that a felony had in fact been com-
mitted. See, e.g. Murphy v. Murray, 74 Cal. App. 726, 729, 241 P. 938, 940 (1925); Martyn v.
Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 412, 198 A.2d 700, 706 (1964). A few courts have required an "actual"
necessity for the use of deadly force. See, e.g., Union Indemnity Co. v. Webster, 218 Ala. 468, 478,
118 So. 794, 803 (1928); Fields v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 334, 337, 151 N.E.2d 188, 189, 175
N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (1958). Several courts have required that a felony in fact had been committed. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 259 Ky. 789, 797, 83 S.W.2d 521, 525 (1935); Common-
wealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 490, 45 A.2d 235, 239 (1946).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
security,"' 62 because it went "beyond mere 'physical characteristics . ..con-
stantly exposed to the public.'"63 Although the Court upheld the search in
Cupp,64 by characterizing the taking of fingernail samples as a severe intrusion
the decision underscores the magnitude of an intrusion into the body that results
from the use of deadly force.
At the same time, the Cupp decision raises a point that may diminish the
individual interest in cases involving fleeing felons because it suggests that a
greater intrusion may be allowed when necessary to retrieve evanescent evi-
dence, perhaps including a fleeing felon.65 The Court's decision in Sharpe raises
another point that may diminish the individual's interest in cases involving a
fleeing felon. In Sharpe the Court listed a suspected drug trafficker's attempt to
avoid arrest as one of the factors that established the reasonableness of a twenty
minute investigatory detention. 66 Arguably, a fleeing felony suspect's interest is
also dimininshed because the suspect chooses to provoke the police officer by
running away.
The critical factors in Cupp and Sharpe-that a fleeing felon constitutes
evanescent evidence and that a fleeing felon has by his or her own actions cre-
ated a need for more intrusive government actions-clearly increase the magni-
tude of the governmental interest involved. Nevertheless, even after integrating
these factors into the balancing process, the permissible use of deadly force to
apprehend all fleeing felons cannot be reconciled with other fourth amendment
cases. The use of deadly force constitutes an intrusion that is unique in its sever-
ity, thus requiring considerable concern for the individual's rights. Examination
of those fourth amendment decisions in which the Court has considered the
constitutionality of a police procedure that results in bodily intrusion further
supports this proposition.
In Schmerber the Court approved the use of a blood alcohol test on an
individual suspected of drunken driving; a "seizure" that involved a relatively
minor intrusion into the suspect's body.67 The Court, however, considered the
possible risk to the suspect's health, which it deemed a crucial factor in the
62. Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1972)). In Cupp the husband of a
strangulation victim came voluntarily to the police station, where officers saw a spot of blood on his
fingernail. Id. at 292.
64. The evanescent nature of the evidence in Cupp influenced the Court to uphold the search.
The evidence would have been lost forever if the officers had not acted quickly. After denying the
officers' request to take samples from his fingernails, the suspect began rubbing his hands together
and against the change in his pockets. Id. at 296.
65. See id.
66. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1576. The suspect in Sharpe did not pull over when a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) agent first tried to stop his vehicle. The suspect's companion pulled his
vehicle over in response to the officer's summons, evidently so that the suspect, who was transporting
bales of marijuana, could avoid arrest. A twenty minute delay resulted because a state trooper later
caught up with the suspect and detained him until the DEA agent arrived. Id. at 1571-72.
The Court noted that the officer used all "due diligence" and that the suspect tried to avoid
arrest; however, the Court based its decision on other factors. Moreover, the Court emphasized that
there should be no fixed time limit on investigatory stops. Id.
67. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
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balancing process.68 An individual's interest in his or her own health and safety
augments the individual's interest in privacy traditionally analyzed in fourth
amendment cases.69 The Schmerber Court stated that when a bodily intrusion is
involved, the individual's interest is expanded to include an interest in health
and safety.70 This factor's presence distinguishes the analysis of bodily intru-
sions from the traditional analysis in which the governmental interest must be
weighed against only the individual's interest in privacy. Recognizing this point,
the Schmerber Court wrote: "[B]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the
human body rather than with state interferences with property relationships or
private papers ... we write on a clean slate."' 71 The Court concluded that the
intrusion resulting from blood testing was justified largely on the grounds that
the risks involved were minimal.
72
Underscoring the importance of the "health and safety" factor, in Winston
the Court refused to order the surgical removal of a bullet from beneath a sus-
pect's collarbone when the medical risks were the "subject of sharp dispute."1
7 3
Again, the Court impliedly added a health and safety consideration to the fourth
amendment balancing test, suggesting that bodily intrusion cases call for a bal-
ancing of the governmental interest in law enforcement against the individual's
interest in privacy and the individual interest in health and safety. Applying the
test established in Schmerber, the Winston Court held that the governmental
interest was insufficient to justify the intrusion even though the highest standard
employed in traditional fourth amendment cases-the virtual certainty that the
search would disclose relevant evidence-was met. 74 Although the surgery in
Winston was unessential because other evidence of the suspect's guilt was avail-
able, 75 the Court's emphasis on the importance of the individual's interest in
health and safety is clear.
Garner involved an individual's interest in avoiding a serious or deadly bod-
ily injury. Thus, the Court was constrained by those fourth amendment deci-
68. Id. at 771-72. The Court in Winston v. Lee, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985), stated that health and
safety factors played a "crucial" role in its decision in Schmerber. Id. at 1617. Other decisions that
have placed heavy emphasis on the health and safety factors include: United States v. Crowder, 543
F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (fourth amendment permits court to order minor operation to remove
bullet when evidence could not be obtained in any other way), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977);
Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974) (fourth amendment reasonableness standard
prohibits court from ordering removal of bullet from defendant's spinal canal when intrusion would
involve trauma, pain, and possibly death); and State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982)
(fourth amendment prohibits court from ordering major surgery to remove bullet, but permits court
to order minor surgery to remove bullet).
69. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
70. Id. at 768.
71. Id. at 767-68.
72. Id. at 771. The decision in Schmerber was limited strictly to its facts. The Court stated:
"That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an indi-
vidual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substan-
tial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions." Id. at 772.
73. Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1615.
74. Id. at 1611.
75. Id. at 1619. The other evidence of the suspect's guilt included an eyewitness identification
and the proximity of the scene of the crime to the place where the suspect was found with the bullet
wound. Id.
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sions in which it had found individual rights to be worthy of greater protection
when a search or seizure involves an intrusion into a person's body.
7 6 The
health and safety factor was a necessary consideration in the Garner Court's
balancing process. Further, the Court made clear that the individual's interest
involved in Garner is unparalleled in importance, stating that "[t]he intrusive-
ness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched" and that a "suspect's
fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon."
77
Under the fourth amendment balancing test the individual's interest must
be weighed against the governmental interest in using the procedure. In Garner
the Court recognized that the governmental interest in effective law enforcement
is very strong.78 The Court expressed doubt, however, that the use of deadly
force to apprehend all fleeing felons facilitates the government's goal of effective
law enforcement. 79 The Court pointed to three considerations in support of its
conclusion. First, studies show that police use of deadly force generally does not
deter individuals from attempting to avoid arrest.80 Second, the use of deadly
force prevents the judicial system from playing its designated role in society.8 1
Last, many law enforcement officials already limit the authority to use deadly
force on fleeing felons, which suggests that the practice is not essential to effec-
tive law enforcement. 82 These factors diminish the governmental interest in us-
ing deadly force in apprehending a fleeing felon.
Because of the heightened individual interest and the diminished govern-
mental interest involved in Garner, the Court concluded that a proper balance is
struck when a polce officer uses deadly force only as a last resort and only to
apprehend fleeing felons whom the officer has probable cause to believe are dan-
gerous.8 3 The Court refused to condone the infliction of a serious and possibly
fatal injury to promote the governmental interest in preventing property
crime.
8 4
Garner fits squarely within prior fourth amendment cases. The individual's
interest in avoiding a serious or deadly bodily injury is much greater than the
interests examined in other fourth amendment cases. For example, the intru-
siveness of a blood test, 85 the taking of fingernail samples,
8 6 a brief detention, 87
or even surgery, 88 is minor compared to the intrusiveness of a seizure by means
of deadly force. Furthermore, the governmental interest in capturing a
76. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
77. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700.
78. Id. at 1700-01.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1701 (citing W. GELLER & K. KARALES, SPLIT SECOND DECISIONS 67 (1981)); Fyfe,
Observations on Police Deadly Force, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 376, 378-81 (1981); Sherman, Reducing
Police Gun Use, CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANIZATION 98, 120-23 (M. Punch ed. 1983)).
81. Id. at 1700.
82. Id. at 1701.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (discussed supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text).
86. See Cupp, 412 U.S. at 291 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 62-65).
87. See cases cited supra notes 43-45; text accompanying notes 43-45.
88. See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1615 (discussed supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text).
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nondangerous felon arguably is no greater than the governmental interests ex-
amined in other fourth amendment cases. When a suspected felon is neither
armed nor suspected of a violent crime, the felon's arrest cannot be significantly
more important than the arrest of a suspected drunken driver 9 or drug traf-
ficker.90 The governmental interest in Garner may be strengthened because the
fleeing felon probably never would have been arrested had he gotten away and
because his own actions prompted the need for more intrusive action. The
Court, however, concluded that other considerations suggest that the use of
deadly force is an inferior means of enforcing the law. 91 The Court's decision
suggests that if the governmental interest in Garner was stronger than the gov-
ernmental interest in other fourth amendment cases, it was only slightly so.
Both Winston and Schmerber indicate that because the threat to a suspect's
health and safety is unique in its severity, the traditional fourth amendment bal-
ancing test must be adjusted to include consideration of this threat. Thus, the
Garner Court's conclusion that deadly force is reasonable only when it is neces-
sary to remove a threat of physical injury is in line with the other fourth amend-
ment decisions. To achieve consistency among the decisions, the governmental
interest must rise in proportion to the heightened individual interest if the police
practice is to be permitted. When compared with the individual interests at is-
sue in Cupp, Sharpe, Winston, and Schmerber, the individual interest at issue in
Garner was much more significant. The Garner Court concluded that the gov-
ernmental interest in apprehending a nondangerous felon, when compared with
the individual interest involved, is not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force.
However, the governmental interest in apprehending a dangerous fleeing felon
includes protecting the general public and thus assumes a position of greater
significance. The Garner decision requires this increased level of governmental
interest before a police officer may use deadly force.92
The dissent in Garner challenged the majority's abandonment of the com-
mon-law rule authorizing the use of deadly force if necessary to apprehend a
fleeing felon. Justice O'Connor reasoned that "constitutional holdings must be
sensitive ... to the history of the Fourth Amendment" 93 and refused to con-
clude that the fourth amendment proscribes a police practice that was accepted
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. 94 Writing for the majority, Justice
White concluded that deference to the common-law rule was unwarranted in
this situation.95 Justice White wrote that "reliance on the common-law rule in
89. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (discussed supra text accompanying note 53).
90. See, e.g., Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1570 (discussed supra text accompanying note 51).
91. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700-01.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1707 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1709 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote:
Although the Court has recognized that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must
respond to the reality of social and technological change, fidelity to the notion of constitu-
tional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on governmental action requires us to impose
a heavy burden on those who claim that practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted are now constitutionally impermissible.
95. Id. at 1702-03.
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this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical
inquiry."'96 The majority concluded that the common-law rule cannot be trans-
ferred to modem day society for several reasons. First, when the common-law
rule was first applied, all felonies were punishable by death.9 7 Second, today
many felonies are nondangerous offenses. 98 Third, the lack of a means of long-
range deadly force gave the common-law rule a practical limitation that it does
not have today.99 Last, the Court found support for its abandonment of the
common-law definition of reasonableness in the use of deadly force in statistics
showing that more than one-half of the states and over eighty-five percent of all
police department policies limit the common-law rule to some degree.100
Previous fourth amendment cases provide little direct support for the
Court's refusal to defer to the common-law rule. The Court traditionally has
been reluctant to overturn a clear definition of "reasonable" that was universally
accepted at the time of the fourth amendment's adoption. 101 Some support for
the Garner Court's decision, however, may be found in the Court's emphasis in
prior decisions on the importance of factors such as an announced congressional
determination on the issue, the prevailing law in the states, or the Model Penal
Code, in addition to the common-law interpretation.1
0 2
In Carroll v. United States10 3 the Court approved the common-law defini-
tion of reasonableness, but also found support for its decision in several federal
statutes incorporating the same definition.'14 Similarly, in United States v. Wat-
son 105 the Court looked not only to the common-law rule prevailing at the time
the fourth amendment was adopted, but also to acts of Congress, state laws, and
the Model Penal Code in deciding to uphold the common-law rule. 10 6 Aban-
doning the common-law approach, the Court in Payton v. New York 107 noted
that there was no federal statute expressing a congressional determination on the
proper definition of the reasonableness of a warrantless arrest in a private home
and that although a majority of states applied the common-law rule, the trend
was away from that rule.'0 8 However, Payton is distinguishable from Carroll,
Watson, and Garner because the Court in Payton found much uncertainty and
96. Id. at 1702.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1703.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1705 (citing K. MATULIA, A BALANCE OF FORCES: A REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 161 (1982) (table)).
101. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (abandoning the common-law ap-
proach); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding the common-law approach); Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (upholding the common-law approach).
102. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
103. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
104. Id. at 151. In Carroll the Court approved a warrantless search of an automobile, distin-
guishing automobiles from houses on the basis of the common law.
105. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
106. Id. at 421-23. In Watson the Court approved a warrantless arrest conducted by a postal
inspector.
107. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
108. Id. at 598-99, 601. The Payton Court prohibited, under the fourth amendment, a warrant-
less entry into a suspect's home for the purpose of making a routine felony arrest.
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ambiguity in the common-law rule.10 9 In Payton the Court stated that "a study
of the common law.., reveals a surprising lack of judicial decisions and a deep
divergence among scholars" and that "our study of the relevant common law
does not provide the same guidance that was present in Watson."' 110 Thus, Gar-
ner appears to be the only decision in which the Supreme Court has examined
the common law and found a clear and unequivocal common-law definition of
reasonableness, yet has abandoned that definition.
As the majority noted, the Garner Court's decision to abandon the com-
mon law does not contradict its earlier fourth amendment decisions because the
use of deadly force against a fleeing felon was very different at common law.'1 1
Indeed, the Payton Court recognized that a "longstanding, widespread practice
is not immune from constitutional scrutiny.... This is particularly so when the
constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word 'reasonable,' and when cus-
tom and contemporary norms necessarily play such a large role in the constitu-
tional analysis." 112 In addition to the difference between the circumstances
surrounding the use of deadly force to apprehend all fleeing felons in the era
during which the common-law rule arose and those that surround it today, sup-
port for the Court's decision in Garner is manifested in the recent trend away
from the common-law rule.
113
Public policy concerns also suggest that a police officer's right to use deadly
force to apprehend a fleeing felon should be limited. A number of commentators
have criticized the use of deadly force to apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons
as unusually cruel. 114 The irrationality of the practice was well characterized by
Professor Mikell, who wrote:
May I ask what we are killing him for when he steals an automobile
and runs off with it? Are we killing him for stealing the automobile?
... It cannot be then that we allow the officer to kill him because he
stole the automobile, because the statute provides only three years in a
penitentiary for that .... Is it for fleeing that we kill him? Fleeing
from arrest is also a common law offense and is punishable by a light
penalty, a penalty much less than that for stealing the automobile. If
we are not killing him for stealing the automobile and not killing him
for fleeing, what are we killing him for?11 s
Concern about the use of deadly force to apprehend nondangerous fleeing
felons is not misplaced. A Memphis study, for example, showed that in almost
109. Id. at 592.
110. Id. at 592, 597.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
112. Payton, 445 U.S. at 600.
113. See Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1699 n.7, 1703-05. Over one-half of the states and the Model
Penal Code have followed this trend. Id.
114. See, e.g., Pearson, The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MICH. L. REV. 957 (1930);
Sherman, Execution Without Trial Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71
(1980); Comment, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L. REV. 566
(1961). The argument that use of deadly force to apprehend a nondangerous felon violates the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has never been accepted by a
court. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (V.D. Tenn. 1971) (three-judge court).
115. 9 A.L.I. PROC. 187 (1931) (quoting Professor Mikell).
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two-thirds of the instances in which police officers fired their weapons, the target
was a nonviolent felony suspect.' 16 Equally unsettling is the arbitrariness of the
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors as the basis for determining
when police officers may use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect. In
certain cases misdemeanants arguably present a greater danger to society than
do felons.'
17
Additional criticisms of the unlimited right to use deadly force to appre-
hend a fleeing felon can be found in the literature. First, the use of deadly force
cannot be justified on the grounds of general deterrence' 1 8 because studies of the
rates of police shootings indicate that these rates have little or no association
with crime rates.11 9 Second, one commentator has pointed out that the argu-
ment that a fleeing suspect has given up his or her constitutional rights is neither
consistent with our system ofjustice120 nor necessarily true; the reasons underly-
ing a suspect's flight may be distrust and fear rather than a lack of concern for
constitutional rights. 121 Last, an important issue associated with a police of-
ficer's right to use deadly force is that of racial discrimination. The available
studies indicate that minorities are the victims of police shootings in dispropor-
tionate numbers.122 This imbalance represents a sharp deviation from societal
notions of equality under the law. Because these policy considerations are com-
pelling, they undermine the justification for police use of deadly force and sug-
gest that it should only be permitted when necessary to dispel an immediate
threat.
One commentator has called the standard set by the Garner Court "moder-
ate." 123 Indeed, the Court could have imposed additional restrictions on law
116. Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, I 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 361, 362 n.4 (1976) (citing Brief for Appellant at Appendix A, Wiley v. Memphis Police
Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977)).
117. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) explanatory note (1962). "[The felony/misde-
meanor distinction is inherently incapable of separating out those persons of such dangerousness that
the perils arising from failure to accomplish immediate apprehension justifies resort to extreme force
to effect arrest." MODEL PENAL CODE, Part I, 2 Commentaries, at 106 (1962).
118. Fyfe, supra note 80, at 379-81. Fyfe argues that deterrence is a popular rationale for justify-
ing police practices, despite the paucity of support for its effectiveness, because it is simplistic. Id.
119. Fyfe, supra note 80, at 379 n.7.
120. Mogin, The Policeman's Privilege to Shoot a Fleeing Suspect: Constitutional Limits on the
Use of Deadly Force, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 533, 549 (1981). To illustrate the point that a suspect
does not give up his or her constitutional guarantees by merely refusing to cooperate with law en-
forcement officers, Mogin describes what happens when the orderly progression of a trial is inter-
rupted by a disorderly defendant. At most, the disorderly defendant will lose his or her right to be
present at the trial. The defendant will not lose the right to a jury trial and will not be declared
guilty immediately after the incident. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. (citing Brief for Appellant at Appendix A, Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d
1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977)). A study of the Memphis Police Department
showed that 96 of 114 victims of police deadly force who were suspected of property crimes were
black. Id. at 540 n.42. A Philadelphia study reported that blacks were shot and killed by police four
times more often than would be expected based on their percentage in the general population and
three times more often than would be expected from their percentage among arrestees. Id. at 540
n.42 (quoting Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL.
Sci. 225, 226 (1963)).
123. High Court Curbs Police Force Against Nonviolent Suspects, 16 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLET-rER
4, 5 (1985) (quoting James Fyfe, consultant to the Police Foundation).
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enforcement practices by permitting police use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing
felony suspect only when the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officer
or to others. The common-law standard-that the police officer must have a
reasonable belief that a felony had been committed, or that a felony in fact had
been committed-is too liberal to be consistent with other fourth amendment
decisions. To be consistent, a standard at least as strict as the one imposed by
the Court in Garner is required. Indeed, because the fleeing felon's interest in
health and safety is so strong, consistency arguably calls for an even stricter
standard, such as probable cause to believe that the suspect presents an immedi-
ate danger to the officer or to others before the officer uses deadly force. A
comparison of the interests and rights involved in Garner to those involved in
other fourth amendment decisions supports this position.
The rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Garner may have limited practi-
cal effect because most police departments already impose similar limitations on
a police officer's right to use deadly force. Nevertheless, because the Court's
decision in Garner makes it clear that the Constitution forbids a hasty decision
to kill a perpetrator of a nonviolent crime, and because it may save the life of a
youth who steals ten dollars and runs from a police officer in fear, it is long
overdue. Public policy concerns and the strong interest in the individual's
health and safety, however, indicate that additional restrictions should have
been placed on the use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons. The Garner
Court should have expanded its decision by holding that the use of deadly force
to apprehend a fleeing felon is justified only when the suspect poses an immedi-
ate danger to the officer or to others.
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